One of the great things about America is that people can be who they are (well, for the most part – every society has their close-minded yahoos). This struck me the other day as I sat in a briefing about a particular, large-scale program being run by the US over here. When we Americans go to another country, we take pains to adapt our own actions to local culture. Here for example, our women wear a hijab when dealing with locals, almost everyone uses the salaam alikum greeting, and we drink lots of tea. We do these, and other, things to show respect for the local culture. However, when foreign people come to our country, we also take pains (for the most part) to allow them to continue practicing their culture, although we typically don't join in. This may emanate from some deep-seated American desire to be liked, but that is another story. The bottom line is that, as a whole, Americans tend toward facilitating the practice of other cultures. However, when it comes to Americans teaching or helping others, this practice seems to be cast aside and notions of "we know best" and "our way is better" come into play. This is painfully obvious here when it comes to the implementation of rule of law.
At a recent conference on rule of law, a well-respected and knowledgeable woman stood before everyone and proclaimed, “I have done this type of work in more than a dozen countries and this is the largest and most complex operation I’ve ever seen.” She then paused for effect, as if to emphasize the reverence the statement should hold – as if this is a good thing. Like most folks devoting their time to building (no, we are not rebuilding) Afghanistan, I know she means well. But is complexity beneficial here?
Less than half of Afghans are literate and this cannot be changed overnight. Due to the reality of politics here, many illiterate Afghans hold positions of power. This lack of education combines with an egocentrism that borders on xenophobia leading many Afghans to reject much of what Western civilization has to offer. Additionally, the national income cannot support everything we are building. Yet we build using a "large and complex" model? This is the problem with our effort here. We build organizations and institutions with a western, developed country mindset. However, Afghanistan is neither western nor developed. Afghanistan is aspiring to be a functional third world country and we're instituting practices designed for first world countries. As I’ve said here before, we’re trying to give them a Cadillac when a Corolla will not only do, but it is what they want.
This misguided methodology of bringing rule of law in the midst of war, leads to success being measured not by efficiency or effectiveness but solely on volume. We measure the number of police officers trained, the number of judges trained, and the number of courthouses built with no real thought to the effectiveness of these institutions. Are the police paid enough so that they will not extract bribes from citizens? Have they bought into the notion of rule of law so that they will stand in the face of Taliban threats after we leave? Are judges following law or Pashtun custom that may or may not conflict with law? Are judges even working within their districts or are they simply collecting a check while residing in the relative safety of Kabul (this happens more than you might think)? Do the fancy courthouses we build even have electricity?
Our hubris doesn’t stop here, however. In addition to seeking to supplant traditional modes of justice with formal, western-style ones, we are also attempting to restructure their governmental agencies. This was explained via a PowerPoint slide that would make any PowerPoint Jedi proud. It was composed of sweeping lines replicating lines of control connecting boxes representing various agencies. Change the boxes to circles, add some color, and it might have looked like a plate of spaghetti and meatballs. One wonders what Afghans think when they see this? Would they support it in the absence of American dollars? Will they do so when those dollars disappear?
Yes, complexity is the name of the game here. Within international circles, complexity sells. It has become the default answer. Why? In the aftermath of the Cold War, where notions of conventional warfare ruled, unconventional warfare has become the norm. This has led to much consternation in the power elite because their lack of familiarity with this style of warfare has led them to believe it is new (it is not). Academics and pseudo-academics have sought to capitalize on this by inventing new terms, presenting Venn diagrams, and generally speaking in platitudes to such a degree that the power elite succumbs. After all, this elite cannot admit ignorance can they? This taps into an innate human frailty, a desire not to look stupid. “Wow,” someone thinks when receiving this type of briefing, “this is very complicated, but everyone else seems to be getting it so I’ll go along.” Never mind that everyone else is thinking the same thing. Thus, we all move along in the same direction like lemmings, guided by those who seemingly know better.
But why must it be complicated? You probably wouldn’t realize this from looking at the Afghanistan operation, but counterinsurgency (not a big fan by the way) is actually rather simple. It’s simplicity is captured in the “clear, hold, build” mantra set forth by its proponents. First, you clear the area of insurgents. Then, you establish a hold or defensive position to keep them out. Once this is accomplished, you build. Here, however, we are attempting to do all of these at once. So, while we try to sell the rule of law to the locals, the Taliban pays them night visits. Nothing demonstrates the failure of rule of law, like a Talib stopping by to remind you that he’ll still be here when the Americans leave. Say what you must about the Taliban, they have a very simple and effective method of achieving their objective.
The US effort here would benefit from an understanding of a principle known as Occam’s razor. Okay, I know what you must be thinking: “wait a minute, this guy is telling us complexity is not a favored approach and now he’s pulling out some philosophical/scientific crap?” Until about a year or so ago, I had never heard of this principle either. I first heard it mentioned on a television sit-com and looked it up (how is that for simplistic?). Occam’s razor, in essence, suggests that one should tend toward the simplest explanation. Or in the words of Albert Einstein: “Everything should be kept as simple as possible, but no simpler.” Who knew Einstein came up with the K.I.S.S. (keep it simple, stupid) rule? If it’s good enough for him, couldn’t it work in Afghanistan?
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