Enough!

In 2001, we Americans invade Afghanistan and side with a predominantly Tajik Northern Alliance that, at the time were getting their ass kicked by the Taliban, a predominantly Pashtun group.  We immediately help form a government that includes Tajiks in a majority of high government positions (although not the President).  Security comes quickly to the northern, Tajik areas and we take the fight to the Taliban.  Much later, in an effort to secure long-term peace, we engage in talks with the Taliban using a principal Tajik leader as our pointman.  This Tajik was killed a few days ago by a Pashtun bearing a TBIED (or Turban Borne Improvised Explosive Device).  Yeah, fairly macabre – embrace it! 

So what happens at the demonstrations mourning this dude’s death?  Chants, by Tajiks, of “Death to America!  WTF?  Really?  Most of these asshats would be dead or reduced to poverty under Taliban rule, but they are instead suckling at the teat of the American money spigot and they have the nerve to chant “Death to America!?”  It’s past time to pack our trash and go home.  I say let them fight it out.  We’re only in an ethnic cleansing lull anyway. 

Afghanistan, you must understand, is like a recidivist drug abuser.  You know what I’m talking about – the guy that has relapsed multiple times, dropped out of rehab more time than you can count.  No matter who helps him, he continues to go back to the drugs, even as he knows that it will kill him.  Yet, there is always that one idealistic person that stands ready to help, ready to pour their heart and soul into curing him even as he knows the effort will fail.  America is that person.  Sucker. 

As I contemplate the futility of our efforts here given the population’s apathy or outright hostility to American-led efforts (and I’m not talking about the Taliban and associated groups either), I came across one politician’s solution.  Apparently, our intel reveals a connection between some of the recent attacks in Kabul and ISI, the Pakistani intelligence agency.  Wow!  What a revelation!  It ranks right up there with the sky is blue, grass is green and the Chicago Cubs will always suck.  Tell us something we don’t already know.

Anyway, this “elder statesman” wants to take military action against Pakistan.  The slippery slope dictates this will eventually mean boots on the ground since these guys will never advocate cutting our losses if action short of boots on the ground does not work (you only have to look at their statements on Afghanistan to recognize this).  So let me see if I get this straight: we’ve been in Afghanistan for ten years and have had thousands of troops on the ground to eliminate a threat posed by a “weak” (the term used by our leaders, not me), backward, uneducated militia.  In that time, we’ve expended vast amounts of money and sacrificed the lives of brave souls and we still haven’t succeeded in taming a country of roughly 30 million.  And what is the solution?  Take military action against an even more militant country (after all they supply these fanatical folks) with a population of over 175 million?  Oh, and did I mention they have nukes?  What do you think will happen when the Christian invaders come?  Maybe we’ll be greeted with cheers and flowers like in Iraq.  Oops, wait a minute….

I see the mind-numbing futility of this effort here and am saddened.  However, these calls to broaden the war or remain longer cause me great anger.  I just don’t want to see a time where my son is drafted and sent over here to participate in a needless effort that no longer has any real bearing on our national security so that politicians can fulfill their own visions of grandeur or some idea of a world that looks like America.  You can’t have my son, Mr. Graham.

Conflict Within

“Get the hell out of my office, Bellflower” he said as I walked in.  “But, Sir…” I started to say.  He cut me off abruptly: “I know why you’re here.  Get out!” his voice growing a bit louder and tinged with a degree of exasperation.  “Sir, I want to submit an AA form for transfer,” I quickly blurted out.  “You and every other Marine here,” he yelled, “now get the hell out of here. You’ll probably get your wish soon enough.”  I didn’t.  It was August, 1991, and I was in the Philippines while my old unit, the Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, was in Saudi Arabia for what was shaping up to be the Gulf War.  The game was starting and I damn sure didn’t want to be caught riding pine.  I never did get there.  I went on a jungle patrol and the whole thing was over by the time I got back.  Maybe that’s why we underestimated the situation and stepped in some Shiite in the 2003 version.

I hadn’t thought of that in years – not until I read this story by a soldier just as fed up with his role in this war as I am.  Apparently, this is a common feeling among those military folks assigned to Kabul – at least if actions taken during our recent attack is any indication.  As you likely know by now, insurgents recently attacked the Embassy and ISAF compounds.  Reports indicate that personnel charged with administrative, rather than security, duties grabbed their weapons, headed to the wall and returned fire.  Despite the absence of a clearly identified target, indeed the insurgents were in a building roughly 1 kilometer away, these personnel expended a significant amount of ammunition in their attempt to “schwack” the bad guy.  This is despite the fact that the building itself, much less the insurgents inside, were outside the effective range of the personal weapons used. 

Although I do not condone returning fire in the absence of a clearly identified target, I can certainly understand the desire to do something – something that at least makes you feel as if you are contributing.  Many folks here, myself included, are underutilized or used wholly outside their skill set.  The result is that folks spend their day “coordinating” among various agencies at endless meetings or preparing PowerPoint slides that seem to convey and endless amount of useless “facts” (you can reviews my posts on metrics for clarification here) or any other number of things that makes one feel useless.  As we go through our day like this, we are acutely aware of the corruption within the Afghan government that torpedoes our overall efforts at establishing that government’s legitimacy with the populace.  We are also aware that insurgents (or my favorite euphemism, malign actors; how is that for sanitization?) are making inroads everywhere but in the south, including in the provinces adjacent to Kabul.  Moreover, we see a shift in opinion regarding the viability of the Afghan government after 2014, the time set for US withdrawal.

All of this leads most folks to conclude that the only thing working here is counter-terrorism.  In other words, our efforts to rebuild Afghanistan through the tactics of counterinsurgency or COIN are failing, but counter-terrorism is working quite well.  Counter-terrorism is essentially the selective targeting of insurgents and their leaders through night raids, drone attacks, and/or conventional operations.  In other words, it is the killing that works here (see 11 Sept post).  Thus, it becomes almost natural, when the opportunity presents itself, to try and contribute meaningfully, even if that contribution entails possibly killing someone.  So, yes, I get what the author of the post linked above is going through.  I, however, do not feel the apparent shame he does.  I, like all other military folks, signed a blank check to the United States when I joined the military.  It is up to the military to use me as they see fit.  I may not always agree with how they use me, but I made an agreement.  The honor is in living up to that agreement.  But, I do wish it were different sometimes.

Indeed, it’s the frustration that gets you.  You contemplate the seeming meaningless of your own contributions.  You read the casualty reports and seethe with anger.  You want to help.  You want to take your position on the firing line (although intuitively realizing, at least in my case, that you really are too old for that stuff).  Yeah, I get it – all to well.  Sometimes though, I wonder if I’d feel better about my contribution to the war effort if my job involved killing.  God, forgive me.

Pain

As I sit in Kabul on the tenth anniversary of 9/11, I’m filled with a sense of despondency.  One might think this a normal reaction to the anniversary of an event that has become seared in the memory of my generation.  However, it is not 9/11 per se that causes this feeling – although it is certainly related to it.  At the time of the event that cast aside notions of law and order, justice and righteousness, I was in a courtroom.  My second thought was one of irony for I innately felt the dichotomy between the events occurring in New York, Arlington, and Shanksville and those happening in my courtroom.  One set of events encapsulated all that is wrong with the world while the other captures the dreams of men like Voltaire and Locke.  My first thought, however, ruled that day and continues to do so to this day.

On seeing the second plane rip through tower two, I knew it was no accident; I knew we were going to war.  It was not fear that gripped me, it was vengeance.  I knew enough of American history to know that the same feeling would permeate every line of thinking and every suggested course of action for most Americans, particularly our leaders.  Events such as 9/11, like Pearl Harbor in WWII, unrestricted U-Boat warfare in WWI and the sinking of the USS Maine in the Spanish-American war before it, awake the demons in the American psyche.  America tends to have a visceral reaction to attacks on it.   

Although somewhat isolationist by default (recent history notwithstanding; indeed we even see the reemergence of this now), America is, as Winton Churchill once said, like a teapot – once a fire is lit under it, there is no limit to the power it can produce.  This is certainly true in the military realm.  In response to the sinking of the USS Maine (history debates the actual cause), the US ended Spanish imperialism.  After Germany began unrestricted attacks on American maritime commerce, the US joined Britain and France in so thoroughly defeating the Central Powers that two of the Empires ceased to exist and one, Germany, was humiliated as no nation had been before.  Pearl Harbor brought a level of death and destruction that the world had never seen.  Entire cities were razed and fire bombed, nuclear power was employed and the three main enemy powers remain militarily hobbled and occupied to this very day. 

In recent history, however, we have gotten away from this method of warfare.  Notions of limited war, wherein the means of warfare are constricted not by law but by choice, are the order of the day in the employment of American military power.  Perhaps it is the legacy of Vietnam; I leave others to debate its origin as I simply wish to acknowledge its presence.  Today, we attempt to combine the application of military might with means of persuasion, economic in particular, in order to get our enemy to do our bidding.  With the one hand we strike while the other offers money to rebuild.  Imagine if you will, a confrontation with your nemesis wherein he slaps you and then offers you a bit of money.  Do you forgive the slap and attempt to forge a friendship with him because has offered money?  Or do you simply take the money, feign friendship, and plot your revenge?  Most of our adversaries choose some form of the latter course of action.  However, we continue to try purchasing friendship despite the mounting evidence that it simply does not work and a realization that the coffers are getting a bit low.

Our primary mistake in the aftermath of 9/11, one perpetrated by the Bush Administration, was to broaden our adversary base.  Rather than assess our enemy as encompassing the entity that actually attacked us, we declared war on terrorism.  Think about this for a moment: for the first time in history (at least that I am aware of) a nation declared war on a tactic, on a method of waging war.  How do you defeat such a thing?  In Afghanistan, this line of approach metastasized into a refocus from Al Qaeda (the primary threat) to the Taliban (the secondary threat).  This occurred because we moved from a strategy of coercion to a strategy of persuasion.  Rather than simply employ military power to eliminate the threat posed by Al Qaeda we now seek to persuade a populace, including the Taliban, to do as we wish.  In this respect, we have forgotten Clausewitz, who is viewed as the backbone of western military thinking.  Clausewitz says that we should “pursue one great decisive aim with force and determination.”  We have strayed from this thinking in Afghanistan by simultaneously trying to defeat an enemy and build a nation (notice I say build rather than rebuild, if you’ve been here you’ll know why).  Rather than doggedly pursue the objective of eliminating the threat posed by Al Qaeda, we’ve become bogged down in an effort to get Afghans to like us (through a method known as COIN, or counterinsurgency).  We Americans seem to have some form of psychosis wherein we crave approval, even from those we fight or who, if we truly admit it, don’t really matter.  This is why we’ve spent so much money here in a wasted effort.

This psychosis has permeated our method of warfare to the extent that we have forgotten another Clausewitz lesson: “war therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”  Thus, war is not about buying favor, it is about violence.  Although some readers may feel discomfort at this notion, it has been true since man first picked up a club to defend his procurement of the carcass of some dead animal.  When all other means fail, man must commit acts of violence to compel another to do his bidding.  Like it or not, it is the nature of man.  This violence entails the imposition of death and destruction.  The enemy must be put to the sword; his means of livelihood must be extinguished; he must, in the words of William Tecumseh Sherman, be made to “howl” for war on the enemy must be made “as severe as possible, and show no symptoms of tiring till the [enemy] begs for mercy.”

In today’s instant media world, politicians shirk at the concept of war as it is and seek to develop a more genteel method of waging war.  Despite the lessons of history, they strive for bloodless war.  This is an imaginative concept that resides in the realm of utopianism.  Indeed, this fallacy presents not an opportunity for success against an enemy, but failure.  Consider the massive amount of money spent delivering modernity to Afghanistan.  We have built dams, constructed various buildings, and installed an electrical power grid in a country in which much of the population resides in the 17^th century vis-à-vis technology and mindset.  Thus, we’ve generated expectations of modernity in a society that had no previous expectations of it in a war in which the enemy can expend little energy in thwarting our efforts at meeting those expectations.  Moreover, by doing so, we’ve added another dimension in the fight for legitimacy (the Holy Grail of a counterinsurgency effort).  Typically, a counterinsurgency seeks to establish legitimacy through effective governance.  In trying to buy loyalty through the provision of modernity, the ability to supply that modernity becomes a subcomponent of legitimacy – fail to provide it and you are deemed illegitimate.  Thus, having determined to buy legitimacy, we lose not by being defeated militarily or by failing to establish governance, but by failing to keep the lights on.

In seeking to refine warfare, counterinsurgency, as employed today, generates the conditions necessary to defeat it.  It creates a vicious circle wherein the enemy is hunted down (killing civilians in the process), surviving civilians are mollified with development projects at huge expense, while the enemy simply attacks those projects to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the counterinsurgent.  Moreover, the byzantine process of engaging in development exacerbates the situation since repairs in combat areas are delayed for too long to have an immediate impact, assuming that they could have a desired impact.  Thus, by the time a project is begun in an effort to “win over” the local population that has been disrupted by the fighting, they’ve already chosen the other side or committed to a policy of ambivalence in the absence of a clear winner. 

Some may argue that COIN can indeed work if given enough time.  This argument is often heard from chicken-hawk politicians whose war zone tours consist of the social circuit in Kabul, or perhaps a heavily guarded foray to a forward operating base for an hour or so.  They, and like-minded individuals, often point to the British counterinsurgency operation in Malaysia as support, conveniently forgetting the forced relocation of civilians that permitted success there.  False comparison aside, however, this argument appears to have merit.  Almost anything, if given enough time, has the potential for success.  This argument, however, is specious and misses the point.  Those making this argument view the end state from a COIN perspective rather than a threat perspective.  They argue that we can convert the populace to our side if given enough time and money.  But the threat did not emanate from the Afghan population.  It came from Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda is defeated.  Just this morning, on a cable news show, terrorism expert Peter Bergen said that Al Qaeda’s last significant attack was the London attack on 7 July 2007.   Shortly after taking office, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that Al Qaeda’s key leadership had been reduced to less than two-dozen people, most of whom are no longer in Afghanistan.  Yet we remain.

Why is it that we are still here when the entity that posed the threat has been defeated and scattered?  Some say inertia, others claim some conspiracy between the military, hawkish politicians, and defense contractors.  The real reason though has to do with the initial mistake made by the Bush Administration.  By declaring war on terrorism, we lost sight of the fact that war simply entails using violence to inflict such a degree of pain upon the enemy that he determines that the end he sought is not worth the pain being inflicted.  In other words, violence is used to alter his cost-benefit analysis; it becomes worth more to him to stop the pain than to do that which you do not want him to do.  But if we pull out of Afghanistan, might Al Qaeda reconstitute and pose a threat again?  Sure, this is always a possibility.  We may miscalculate the degree of pain needed.  When that occurs, however, more pain can be inflicted.  It is much cheaper, in both blood and treasure, to revisit the situation as needed than to remain mired in an effort that is so costly and has so little chance of ultimate success.  Our strategy in any war should be to inflict as much pain as possible on the enemy.  Instead, we’ve pursued a strategy of persuasion and we’re the only one feeling the pain. 

We would do well to recall Clausewitz's warning on this topic:  "We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed.  The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity.  Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms."

Simple Things

I really dislike walking through rocks.  Even in my boots, it causes that uneven footing that inevitably leads to turning an ankle or slipping.  Folks back in the States use rocks to zero-scape their yard because they’re either too lazy or too inefficient to keep up a good yard.  I definitely fall into this category as I completely suck at keeping a lush lawn.  However, I don’t use the rocks because I loathe them.  I loathe them because they remind me of being deployed.  Rocks are ubiquitous on FOBs or Forward Operating Bases around the world.  Whenever possible, though, I avoid walking on the rocks.  It’s almost an obsession. 

While recently strolling, or more appropriately stumbling, along a rocky pathway like a pinball, I began thinking about how I missed walking in the lush, green grass at home.  You know that early morning walk around the yard in your bare feet when the grass is still cold from the night’s dew?  That is what I’m referring to.  As I thought about that serene feeling I get when walking through grass like that, I began to think about the other things I miss.  While you might think a nice cold pint of beer or something like that would top the list (and let’s face it, a cold pint of IPA or a Sweetwater 420 would be really good right about now), it’s the common things that are really missed.  So to give you a taste of being deployed, this is some of the stuff I miss.

1.  Silverware/plates:  white plastic forks, spoons, and knives are what we get rather than silverware.  They come in a plastic bag and often break as you try to open them.  It’s as if Delta Airlines runs our food services and TSA is on their case.  As you attempt to cut meat, the knife bends and the fork breaks.  You’re forced to either pick up the meat and eat it like beef jerky or use a pocketknife.  Our trays are of the cardboard, rectangular variety with three small compartments at the top, a medium one at the bottom left, and a large one to the right of that one – sort of like a TV dinner try you get from the grocery store.  Anything particularly juicy will often bleed through the bottom creating a mess.  However, the strangest thing about these trays is how the cafeteria workers treat them.  They seem to have a penchant for filling up the smaller compartments first regardless of what you order.  Thus, you often find your main course in a small compartment.  I’ve even been handed a tray with every compartment except the large one filled with something.  Are they screwing with us, I wonder?

2.  regular doors:  our doors look normal, but they are on some sort of spring device.  This causes them to shut rather loudly.  Now, I realize the necessity of this given the swirling, dust-laden wind we have here, but I cringe every time a door slams.  Somewhere in the deep recesses of my mind, I can hear my mom yelling at me to quit slamming the door.  Open the door, gently shut the door.  Open the door, gently shut the door.  Yeah, she once had me do that for what seemed like an eternity – but I don’t slam doors anymore!  I wonder what sort of things like this my kids will remember about me?

3.  fresh sandwich bread:  no, check that.  I want fresh Wonder Bread.  Yeah, that soft, white slice of heaven that melts in your mouth as you eat your sandwich.  Surrounded by an ever-slightly browned edge, the flour used by Wonder Bread has produced small cocoons of delight for your taste buds.  Yep, it’s as if they’ve captured a cloud in every single bite.  The bread here, however, must have been what the commissariat handed out in Red Square when the communists were running Russia.  Ours isn’t stale mind you, but it isn’t what I’m used to eating, as it’s a bit harder. 

4.  unimpeded  transit:  our compound was built for roughly 2/3 of the people we actually have, I’m told.  It seems like someone tried to cram Grand Central Station into a local bus stop.  People are everywhere.  It is especially crowded in the dining facility (I’m told I can’t call it a chow hall as that “dates me”).  Trying to navigate the chow hall, I mean dining facility, is like maneuvering through the mall at Christmas time (Speaking of malls, wouldn’t they be better if they had a Dad area like they have kid areas?  You know, something on tap and a few TVs with sports on – honey, the question isn’t how long can you shop, it’s how drunk do you want me?).  People bump into one another and I’ve even seen some heated discussions at the toaster over whose bread is whose (why you’d fight over that cardboard is beyond me).

    In the same vein, is the ability to run more than ¼ mile without having to run around someone or make a turn.  My loop is just under one kilometer (.57 mile).  I make 16 turns each loop and typically run 6-8 loops.  Needless to say, I can’t really get up speed, or what passes for speed as I approach my mid-40s.  I think when I get home I’m going to pull a Forest Gump and just run in a straight line until I get bored with it.  However, I’m going home at Christmas and I probably won’t be able to escape going to the mall, so that Dad’s area idea is starting to make a whole lot more sense.

5.   regular TV commercials:  the Armed Forces Network is great for bringing us up-to-date shows and sporting events from the US.  Their commercials, however, leave a lot to be desired.  Rather than hawk products, these commercials engage in a propaganda that would make Joseph Goebbels proud.  They infuse the viewer with a desired method of thinking, eating, and overall lifestyle.  Feel-good stories from the field can make one actually feel as if the effort here is worthwhile.  I understand the impetus behind the message; they should just be a little less transparent about it.  Plus, they don’t even show the stateside Super Bowl commercials and I think I have a right to watch those commercials, don’t I?  It’s in the Constitution isn’t it?

While there are certainly other things that one might desire in being deployed, you have to realize that no matter what you think of your circumstances, someone else has it worse than you do.  The living conditions here are among the best in Afghanistan.  In fact, this is the best I’ve had it in any of my four deployments.  I’ve slept in wet sleeping bags and cots, had nothing but MREs for weeks, and actually had health issues due to an inability to bathe properly on previous deployments  (haha, I think I can actually hear my wife saying “I can’t believe you wrote that!”).  So don’t take this little piece as a complaint.  I’m simply trying to convey some of the simple things one misses when deployed.  Everyone’s story is different; this is mine at this point in time.